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Cannibals, Monsters and Weasels:
Creating a French Enemy in the
United States during the 1790s
Quasi-War and the 2003 Iraq War
Diplomatic Crisis
Hervé-Thomas Campangne
1 Countless  U.S.  presidents  and leaders,  including Ronald Reagan,  Barack Obama and
Donald Trump, have reminded Americans that France is their country’s “oldest ally”
(Riché 2013; Seelow 2013; Obama 2015; Serhan 2017). Likewise, many a French official
has underscored the unwavering and “natural” quality of the commitment between
France  and  the  United  States  (De  Gaulle  1965;  Mitterrand  1984;  Macron  2018).  Yet
political scientists and historians often point to the cyclical nature of French-American
relations (Duroselle 1978; Bozo and Parmentier 2007: 545). They have shown that since
the 1778 Treaty of Amity and Commerce that sealed the alliance between the American
insurgents and the monarchy of Louis XVI, periods of collaboration and alignment have
alternated with times of tension and division. High moments include the 1781 Siege of
Yorktown,  Colonel  Stanton’s  “Lafayette,  we  are  here”  speech as  the  first  American
Expeditionary Force arrived in France in 1917, the D-Day landings in Normandy in 1944,
and  more  recently,  the  close  cooperation  between  the  two  countries’  intelligence
agencies  in their  efforts  to counter terrorism. Times of  conflict  comprise president
Andrew Jackson’s and king Louis Philippe’s disagreement over spoliation claims dating
back to the Napoleonic wars, the aftermath of the 1956 Suez crisis, General De Gaulle’s
1966  decision  to  withdraw  France  from  NATO’s  integrated  military  command,  and
France’s refusal to allow U.S. aircraft to fly over its territory during the American raid
against Muammar Qaddafi’s Libya in 1986. 
2 Among the discords between the two countries, two diplomatic crises especially stand
out. The first one induced the 1790s Quasi-War. The French directorate perceived the
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1795 Jay  Treaty,  which restored economic  relations  between the  United States  and
Great Britain, as a betrayal on the part of its American allies, and consequently allowed
for seizure of  American merchant ships.  In July 1797,  newly elected president John
Adams sent a mission to France to avoid an all-out war. Upon arriving in Paris, the
American diplomats  Gerry,  Pinckney  and Marshall  were  met  by  intermediates  who
demanded a substantial bribe and a low-interest American loan before they could meet
foreign minister Talleyrand. The American envoys refused, and after their dispatches
reached the United States, president Adams disclosed the correspondence to Congress,
replacing  the  names  of  the  French  agents  with  the  letters  X,  Y,  and  Z.  “As  the
humiliation  suffered  by  the  mission  in  Paris  became  clear”,  historian  Alexander
DeConde writes, “many Americans became outspokenly anti French” (DeConde 1966:
75).  Protests  erupted  in  Philadelphia  demanding  war  with  France,  the  Federalist-
controlled Congress passed legislation to fund a naval force, as well as the Alien and
Sedition  Acts  of  1798,  which provided a  form of  response  to  the  perceived French
threat. The undeclared war continued until the convention of 1800 and the Treaty of
Mortefontaine, which reestablished more friendly relations between the two countries.
During the hostilities, France had seized over 2000 American ships.1
3 Two hundred years after the Quasi-War, another major diplomatic crisis created deep
divisions between the two nations following France’s refusal to support the American
military intervention in Iraq in 2003. After foreign minister Villepin’s January 20, 2003
speech  at  the  United  Nations  Security  Council,  in  which  he  reiterated  the  French
position that arms inspections, rather than war, could provide an effective response to
the imperative of disarming Iraq, United States government officials accused France of
obstructing American efforts to oust dictator Saddam Hussein.2 The anger of those who
intended to “punish France” and make it “pay” for its opposition (Bozo 2016: 276) was
soon relayed by a media campaign that sparked an intense wave of Francophobia and
contempt for everything French in the United States. Columnist Charles Krauthammer
contended in The Washington Post that “France has gone far beyond mere obstruction, it
is engaged in sabotage”, and his New York Times colleague Thomas Friedman went as far
as writing of “our war with France” (Friedman 2003). Other editorialists wrote of the
best  way  “to  teach  France  a  lesson”  (Mitchell  2003).  The  French embassy  received
hundreds  of  hateful  emails  and  telephone  calls  (Skoloff  2003),  American  families
refused to host French students because it allegedly represented “too great a risk of
unpleasantness  in  public  places” (Willsher  & Laurence 2003),  stores  bearing French
names  were  vandalized,  and  in  one  instance,  an  ex-marine  murdered  a  Florida
bartender who had the bad idea of criticizing the war in Iraq and speaking French with
his girlfriend on the telephone. The murder was later deemed racist by the court (Bozo
2016: 274).
4 In  the  late  1700s  as  well  as  the  early  2000s,  the  French  were  widely  depicted  as
America’s  antagonist.  The aim of  this  article  is  to  provide an understanding of  the
process through which the image of France was transformed, in both instances, from
that of ally and friend into that of a threatening other. Particular attention will be paid
to the creation and use of cultural stereotypes in official statements, as well as in the
media campaigns that marked both diplomatic crises. My working hypothesis is that
although the enemy image of France underwent significant changes between 1797 and
2003, a number of cultural stereotypes that were created during the Quasi-War were
reactivated during the 2003 diplomatic rift. 
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5 This article will also examine the domestic political divisions that provided the context,
in the United States in 1797 and 2003, for the creation of enemy images of France that
illustrate the classic paradigm that “inventing an enemy begins, paradoxically, with the
invention of the self” (Vuorinen 2012: 1). In both instances, the French antagonist was a
mirror and a scapegoat that provides as much information on American identity and
U.S. political debates as it does about American views on France and the French.
6 Since my theoretical approach is that of cultural history, I have relied on a wide variety
of  sources.  Studies  and articles  by  historians  and political  scientists  have  provided
analyses of the diplomatic and political foundations of the Quasi-War and Iraq crisis.
For the study of images of France and the French, I have relied on newspapers and
magazine articles contemporary of both crises, as well as on various forms of satirical
media. Works by cultural historians, as well as by specialists of International Relations,
have provided a theoretical framework through which to understand the creation and
functioning of cultural stereotypes and enemy images.
 
When Friends Become Enemies
7 In his seminal book How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace, Charles A.
Kupchan describes the process through which hostile nations replace competition and
aggression with friendship and cooperation in order to achieve reconciliation. Among
the key ingredients needed for rapprochement and peace, Kupchan lists “the generation
of new narratives and identities”:
Through elite statements,  popular culture (media, literature, theatre),  and items
laden with political symbolism such as charters, flags, and anthems, the states in
question embrace a new domestic discourse that alters the identity they possess of
the other. The distinctions between self and other erode, giving way to communal
identities and a shared sense of solidarity,  completing the onset of stable peace
(Kupchan 2010: 6) 
8 Relations between the United States and France in 1797-98 and 2003-2004 followed a
path that  was the exact  opposite  of  the course  described above.  In  both instances,
official statements opened the way to media campaigns that resulted in the creation of
an enemy image of France that was accepted by a significant portion of the American
public.3 
9 During both crises, the “elite statements” that signaled that France had become an
antagonist  in  the  eyes  of  American  officials  came  from  the  highest  levels  of
government:  in  1798,  President  Adams  repeatedly  issued  calls  to  arms  against  the
French in front of town assemblies, societies and militia companies (DeConde 1966: 81),
while  Representatives  in  Congress  advocated  “open  and  deadly  war  with  France”
(Bowman 1974: 331).  In 2003, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s reproach that
“France has been a problem” (Rumsfeld 2003), Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s
willingness to “punish France”, and Colin Powell’s assertion that France would be made
to suffer for its opposition to the war (Knowlton 2003a) prompted editorialist Thomas
Friedman to write in The New York Times: “It’s time we Americans came to terms with
something: France is not just our annoying ally. It is not just our jealous rival. France is
becoming  our  enemy”  (Friedman  2003).  These  lines  sum  up  the  spirit  of  a  media
campaign whose effects paralleled the damaging work carried out by the press in the
context of the 1790s Quasi-War.
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10 In 2003 as in 1798, the media accomplished what the polished language of international
diplomacy could not: it spread deprecatory images of France and the French in order to
rouse public opinion against a nation that came to incarnate everything un-patriotic
and un-American. In both cases, the media campaigns were carefully orchestrated. In
1797-8,  three  quarters  of  the  press  supported  the  administration’s  stance  against
France (DeConde 1966: 79). Federalist newspapers such as The Boston Gazette and New
York Commercial Advertiser became fora for all those who sought to spread rumors of an
impending invasion of the United States by French troops, calling for military action
against France. Alexander Hamilton himself took to pen under the pseudonym “Titus
Manlius” to publish a series of articles titled “The stand”. “Like the prophet of Mecca”,
he wrote in one of these columns, “the tyrants of France press forward with the alcoran
of their faith in one hand, and the sword in the other” (Hamilton 1798). The association
between Frenchmen and Muslims, a topos that would be widely used in 2003 as well, can
be seen as the justification of a crusade-like enterprise.
11 In  2003,  leaks  from  alleged  “anonymous  administration  officials”  (Ireland  2003)
provided the source of articles accusing France of selling military equipment to Saddam
Hussein’s Iraq. As noted by political scientist Justin Vaïsse, the breadth and depth of the
disinformation campaign against France was striking: anti-French articles did not only
appear in controversial papers such as The Washington Times and New York Post,4 but also
in prestigious and widely read outlets such as The New York Times, The Washington Post,
and Newsweek (Vaïsse 2003b).
 
From Monstrous France to France the Weasel
12 At the time of the Quasi-War as well as during the 2003 Iraq crisis, the media campaigns
against France offered a potent illustration of the classic paradigm of dehumanization
and demonization described by Jerome Frank and Andrei Melville in their study on
“The image of the enemy and the process of change” (1988). Members of the allegedly
hostile  group  were  depicted  “as  bestial  and  subhuman  on  the  one  hand,  and
diabolically clever on the other” (Frank & Melville 1988: 201). 
13 One  image  especially  stands  out  in  the  flow  of  caricatures  and  demeaning
representations of the Gallic  nation characteristic of  the late 1790s:  France and the
French  were  described  as  monstrous,  bloodthirsty  creatures  that  needed  to  be
suppressed by sheer reason of their inhumanity. An article in the August 27, 1798 Boston
Gazette resorted  to  atrocity  propaganda,  comparing  the  French  Jacobins  to  an
impressive list of tyrants, barbaric invaders, and threatening others: “Nero- Caligula -
the Goths and Vandals - Nay! our wild Indians, compared with the democratic rulers of
the French,  have been but infants in the practice of  Treason,  Murder and Rapine”.
French nationals whom the author of the article accuses of having murdered the crew
of  the  ship  Hunter are  then  likened  to  cannibals,  in  reference  to  an  anti-Jacobin
pamphlet titled The Cannibal’s progress, that described the atrocities committed during
the invasion of Swabia by the French Republican army.5 The object of his article, the
author told his readers, was “that by impressing upon your minds the perfidy, cruelty
and wickedness of the enemy you now have to contend with, you may become alarmed,
more animated, firm, and united”.
14 If  the  French  were  savages  and  cannibals,  their  nation  could  be  depicted  as  a
“Harlequin creature, now vapouring on the national stage with a head of brass and
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triple  ribbons,  with  a  heart,  the  ark  of  impiety,  with  finger  dropping  blood”,
recognizable  by  “her  gypsy  gibberish,  her  monkey  gestulation  [sic],  her  habitual
perfidy, her impiety to God, or her cruelty to men” (Farmer’s Weekly Museum, January 2,
1798). A striking depiction of France as a monster appeared in a political cartoon titled
“Cinque tetes or the Paris Monster”, satirizing the XYZ affair (Figure 1). It depicts the
American envoys responding to a five-headed creature representing the five members
of the French Directorate: “Cease bawling, monster! We will not give you six pence”. In
the background, a group including a black man, who represents freed slaves, is feasting
on  frogs,  under  the  gaze  of  an  allegory  of  France  represented  as  a  hideous  “Lady
guillotine”, who has just decapitated a citizen. With these images, the struggles of the
United States against France were presented as more than a diplomatic and economic
conflict:  they  became  the  battle  of  two  diverging  concepts  of  the  republic,  one
upholding  values  of  civilization  and  freedom,  while  the  other  chose  the  vices  of
barbarism, tyranny and terror.
 
Figure 1. Cinque tetes or the Paris Monster 
Cartoon satirizing the XYZ affair. 1797.
15 Significantly, dehumanizing images of France and the French were also disseminated
during  the  2003  press  campaign  against  a  nation  that  was  blamed  for  organizing
worldwide resistance to the United States’ efforts in the Middle East. In the Wall Street
Journal, Christopher Hitchens described Jacques Chirac as “a positive monster of conceit
[…] the abject procurer for Saddam […] the rat that tried to roar” (Young & Henley,
2003). An enemy image of France quite different from, but no less striking than that of
the cannibalistic monster of the Quasi-War began to spread in the media: France was
now  a  malevolent  rodent,  a  “weasel”  that  undermined  and  threatened  American
efforts. If the Quasi-war of the 1790s came close to tragedy, the 2003 diplomatic conflict
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with France was a  sinister  farce.  The February 14,  2003 cover of  The New York  Post
displayed a doctored picture of  a  United Nations meeting in which the French and
German diplomats were represented as monstrous half-human, half-weasel creatures
(Figure 2). Although the Gallic nation certainly no longer posed a direct military threat
as it had in the late 1790s, it deserved, in the words of columnist Ralph Peters, “to be
skinned alive”  (Peters  2003)  because  of  its  perceived betrayal  of  the  United States.
Monster or rodent, the French enemy of 1798 and 2003 was stripped of its humanity, in
classic war rhetoric fashion: as David Livingstone Smith has shown, comparing people
to monsters or animals is a distancing tactic, a justification of bellicose intentions, and
“a way of reassuring ourselves that they are so different from us” (Smith 2011: 136). In
1798  and  2003,  France  became  a  primary  target  of  the  racist,  xenophobic  and
demeaning stereotypes that flourish in times of geopolitical conflict.
 
Figure 2. Cover of The New York Post, February 14, 2003
Source: https://nypost.com/cover/post-covers-on-february-14th-2003
16 If the anti-French campaigns of 2003 and 1797-98 share many features, the availability
of new forms of media gave twenty-first century proponents of “French bashing” an
advantage  over  their  distant  ancestors.  Beyond  the  traditional  newspapers  and
magazines, Francophobes could reach wide audiences through the radio, television and
the internet. Late-night show hosts and comedians reveled in telling anti-French jokes.
Topoi inherited from the complaints of American soldiers in World War II were often
used for the occasion6: references to the French capitulation in 1940, to bad hygiene
and  loose  sexual  mores  abounded.  Stereotyping  characteristic  of  the  “system  of
Francophobia” analyzed by Jean-Philippe Mathy (2003)  could be witnessed on most
television networks: “I don’t know why people are surprised that France won’t help us
get  Saddam out  of  Iraq.  After  all,  France wouldn’t  help  us  get  the  Germans out  of
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France!”, Jay Leno told the audience of NBC’s The Tonight Show, a program that reached
an average 5.9 million Americans nightly.7 David Letterman, his competitor on CBS’ Late
Show quipped that “The last time the French asked for ‘more proof’ it came marching
into Paris under a German flag,” while comedian Conan O’Brien turned Saddam Hussein
into the caricature of a Frenchman: “You know why the French don’t want to bomb
Saddam Hussein? Because he hates America, he loves mistresses and wears a beret. He
IS  French,  people”  (Lewis  2006).  On  the  internet,  anti-French  blogs  and  websites
flourished,  many of  them calling  for  a  boycott  of  French products,  a  call  that  was
echoed by commentator Bill O’Reilly on his Fox News channel show, as well as by an
advertisement in the March 26, 2003 issue of The New York Times.  The impact of the
France-U.S. dispute was such that even the market share of French-sounding brands
significantly declined, as shown by a study published in the Review of  Economics and
Statistics (Pandya & Venkatesan 2016).
17 In  2003-4,  attacks  on  France  in  the  popular  media  were  also  relayed  by  a  slew  of
publications  by  scholars  who  sought  to  rewrite  the  history  of  French-American
relations. Different segments of the American population, from television viewers to
readers of newspapers and buyers of history books, were thus exposed to Francophobe
attacks. Mark Molesky (a professor at Seton Hall University) teamed up with National
Review  journalist  John  J.  Miller  to  publish  Our  Oldest  Enemy:  A  History  of  America’s
Disastrous Relationship with France. Harlow Giles Unger (a former Distinguished Visiting
Fellow in American History at George Washington’s Mount Vernon) penned The French
War  against  America.8 In  both publications,  negative  filtering provided a  devastating
narrative of French treachery, backstabbing and dishonesty spanning more than two
hundred years.  According to Unger,  contrary to what most Americans believe,  “the
French did not support the American Revolution to help create a free and independent
new nation, but to try to restore French sovereignty over North America”; De Gaulle
waged a propaganda war against the United States “to ensure his own accession to the
presidency  after  world  war  II”  (Unger  2005).  Molesky  and  Miller  would  have  their
readers believe that “America’s first authentic sense of self was born not in a revolt
against Britain, but in a struggle with France”. The authors of Our Oldest Enemy also
claim that the GIs “literally had to fight their way through the French to get to the
Nazis” (Molesky & Miller 2004), that the French, with the debacle at Dien Bien Phu,
were solely responsible for America’s quagmire in Vietnam, and that all French leaders
have shared the common goal of  maneuvering against the United States across the
globe. Such accusations prompted political scientist Stanley Hoffman to write in Foreign
Affairs:
That a book as shoddy and biased as this one should be published by a reputable
press is eminently regrettable […] instead of providing an honest account of the
facts  and  attempting  to  discern  reasons  behind  them,  the  authors  offer  only
vituperation and contempt (Hoffman 2004: 153)
18 Unger and Molesky’s books certainly provided enemy images of France that acted “like
distorting  lenses  that  magnify  confirming  information  and  filter  out  incompatible
information” (Frank & Melville 1988: 201) in order to rewrite the history of France-U.S.
relations. In both publications, the episode of the Quasi-War figured prominently: the
authors contended that this prolonged season of hostilities was sufficient proof that the
French had been the treacherous enemies of the United States as far back as the 18th
century.
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Conspiracy theories and disinformation
19 In 1798 and 2003, writing a new narrative of French-American relations also entailed
the  “Items  laden  with  political  symbolism  such  as  charters,  flags,  and  anthems”
described by Kupchan (2010: 6) as essential to the process of rapprochement between
hostile nations. During the Quasi-War and Iraq crisis, they played an opposite role as
Francophobes  made  them  a  target  in  the  process  of  degrading  a  nation  that  had
previously enjoyed the status of ally and friend. At the time of the Quasi-War, many
Americans replaced the tricolor cockade that they had worn as a tribute to the sister
republic of France with the black cockade of the Federalists (DeConde 1966: 83). In a
letter to her sister, First Lady Abigail Adams noted how French songs became an object
of public scorn in Philadelphia theatres:
French Tunes have for a long time usurped an uncontrould sway. since the Change
in the publick opinion respecting France, the people began to lose the relish for
them, and What had been harmony, now becomes discord. accordingly their had
been for several Evenings at the Theatre something like disorder, one party crying
out for The Presidents march, and yankee Doodle, whilst Ci era, was vociferated
from the other it was hisst off repeatedly. the managers were blamed. (Adams 1798)
20 In 2003 also, traditional French symbols became objects of scorn. Hotel chain Sofitel’s
decision to remove the French flags in front of all of its hotels in the United States as a
precautionary measure is indicative of the depth of the anti-French sentiment. “Sofitel
surrenders, lowers French flag” journalist Rob Kaiser ironically wrote in the Chicago
Tribune as  the  hotel  chain’s  directors  decided  to  replace  the  tricolor  with  flags  of
American  states  and  cities.  One  of  the  best-remembered  expressions  of  “French-
bashing” in the wake of the Iraq war disagreement was the decision to change the name
of “French fries” to “Freedom fries” on the cafeteria menus of the three House office
buildings, and subsequent renaming of “French toast” into “liberty toast” on the menu
aboard presidential  plane Air  Force One (Loughlin 2003). Although there is  nothing
intrinsically French in fries nor in toast cooked with egg batter, the American “war”
with France was clearly a war of words and symbols: just as “sauerkraut” had been
renamed “liberty cabbage” by patriotic Americans after the entry of the United States
into World War I, “liberty fries” were meant to show that the French were now on the
side of tyranny and evil. In both cases, liberty was the concept of choice in the U.S. to
demean the other and praise the self. 
21 Another parallel unites the two diplomatic crises. As French symbols were deprecated
and as the media campaigns raged, conspiracy theories began to spread. In April 1798,
Robert Goodloe Harper, an ex-Charleston Jacobin turned ardent Federalist, rose before
Congress to warn of an impending invasion by five thousand “black troops” sailing
from Saint Domingue. Those black Frenchmen would turn slaves against their masters,
he warned, and create an alliance that would soon “destroy the country” (Papenfuse
1997:  29).  In  the  following months,  eminent  ministers  gave sermons in  which they
alerted their congregations about the evil plans of the illuminati, a secret society whose
agents were hiding amongst Americans, preparing a vast conspiracy and takeover of
the United States (Den Hartog 2015: 45-69). Boston minister and Yale president Timothy
Dwight admonished on July 4, 1798,
Is it that our churches may become temples of reason, our Sabbath a decade, and
our psalms of praise Marseillois hymns? Is it, that we may change our holy worship
into a dance of Jacobin phrenzy, and that we may behold a strumpet personating a
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goddess on the altars of Jehovah? Shall our sons become the disciples of Voltaire,
and  the  dragoons  of  Marat  or  our  daughters  the  concubines  of  the  Illuminati?
(Dwight 1798: 20-21)
22 In  2003,  the  French  were  likewise  presented  as  diabolically  clever  conspirators,  a
perception of enemy subjects that, as Frank and Melville point out, “seriously weakens
inhibitions humans may possess against attacking fellow humans” (Frank & Melville
1988: 201). An allegation made in The New York Times in September 2002 that France
(along with Germany) had sold Iraq high precision switches used to detonate nuclear
bombs had a ripple effect through the American media.9 Journalists Daniel Mitchell
accused  the  French  of  “providing  Saddam  Hussein’s  brutal  regime  with  valuable
technology”, and of actively working to sabotage the U.S. campaign against the Iraqi
dictator  (Mitchell  2003).  Theories  of  French  terror  conspiracies  were  echoed  by
conservative columnist William Safire and Representative Joe Scarborough, and later
magnified  by  Bill  Gertz  in  his  Washington  Times columns  and  book  Treachery.  How
America’s Friends and Foes are Secretly Arming our Enemies (2004). According to Gertz, U.S.
forces had uncovered caches of French-made missiles and other weapons in Baghdad;
Gertz also contended that the Iraqis had shot down an American pilot using a French
missile,  and  that  the  French  government  had  provided  passports  to  secretly  help
officials from Saddam’s regime flee from Iraq (Gertz 2004). 
23 In 2003, as in 1798, the effects of the conspiracy theories were widely felt. During the
Quasi-War, the editors of Republican newspapers attempted to rebuke the anti-French
allegations and bellicose rhetoric spread by the Federalists. Benjamin Franklin Bache
warned readers of his Aurora General Advertiser on August 1, 1798:
In  order  that  “The  people”  should  understand  the  real  point  of  controversy
between France and The US, it is necessary to bring the ultimatum immediately
before them […] Whether it is necessary to commence war on this proposition, and
to call them rogues, pirates, and five headed monsters, for this preliminary, is left
to the decision, not of agents, contracters, office-seekers, and Georgia-bankrupts,
but to YEOMANRY and TRADESMEN, who must finally become private soldiers, and
pay their Taxes for the support of the war. 
24 Bache preached to the converted, while his enemies were less receptive. Federalists
accused him of being a puppet of the French, and angry mobs attacked his residence
(DeConde 1966: 79). 
25 In 2003, responses to French conspiracy theories ranged from embassy spokesperson
Nathalie Loiseau qualifying American allegations of French cooperation with Iraq as
“untrue […] and insulting” (Stanley 2003), to Ambassador Jean-David Levitte’s formal
complaint  that France  was  the  victim  of  a  campaign  of  “repeated  disinformation”
(Knowlton 2003). Levitte’s letter to the White House, State Department and Congress,
whose content was made public in lengthy articles in The Washington Post and The New
York Times, only prompted denials from the White House and Defense Secretary Donald
H.  Rumsfeld,  who told  reporters  there  was  no such campaign.  The effects  of  these
French complaints  on  American  opinion  are  difficult  to  document,  especially  since
political scientists generally agree that “people tend to be receptive to information that
confirms the beliefs they already hold and that individuals are most likely to respond
to messages that resonate with their existing predispositions” (Hayes & Guardino 2010:
64). No matter what the French said, in the Spring of 2003, 40% of Americans did not
consider  France  to  be  an  ally  of  the  U.S.,  with  31%  who  said  that  France  was
“unfriendly”,  and 9% who considered France “an enemy” (Saad 2003).  Another poll
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showed that 64% of Americans held a “mostly unfavorable” or “very unfavorable” view
of France (Gallup Country ratings 2003).
 
The enemy within
26 As indicative as it  was of tense diplomatic relations between the two countries, the
fabrication of a French enemy during the Quasi-War and Iraq crisis was also a reflection
of internal political divisions in the United States. In the late 1790s, the transformation
of France from ally and friend into enemy and foe was used to advance the agenda of a
specific political party. At the time, the Federalists sought to “disentangle” the United
States  from  a  major  colonial  empire  that  had  been  instrumental  in  its  war  for
independence from another colonial empire (Great Britain). As Jasper Trautsch points
out: 
Federalist power brokers envisioned that a military conflict between both countries
would discredit the democratic egalitarianism that France symbolized and instead
bolster  Federalists’  conservative  definition  of  American identity  (Trautsch 2018:
131). 
27 Since France was one of the superpowers of the time, creating an enemy image of the
Gallic nation amounted to affirming America’s independence, its identity as a republic
distinct  from the type of  government established by the French revolution,  and its
future role as what Eliga Gould has called a “treaty-worthy nation” (Gould 2012: 177). In
this context,  France was seen as both an enemy without and an enemy within:  the
Federalists warned of a possible French invasion of the United States and called for an
open war with France; they also campaigned for the elimination of American Jacobin
clubs, and underscored the nefarious influence of French agents on American politics
and government. American supporters of France became extremely suspicious in the
eyes of the Federalists, as shown by this article in the January 3, 1797 Courier of New
Hampshire:
A most important discovery is announced in Philadelphia – the President of the
Bank of Pennsylvania (who, we understand, is a democrat or partizan of France) has
drawn out of the bank the enormous sum of one hundred and eleven thousand
dollars, and appropriated it to the purpose of his private speculations.
28 Obviously,  not  all  Americans  agreed  with  President  Adams  and  the  Federalist-
controlled Congress. If anything, the XYZ affair widened the gap between Francophobe
federalists and Francophile Republicans. However, as Matthew Rainbow Hale notes, it
also greatly contributed “to the marginalization of the notion of French and American
interconnectedness” (Hale 2003: 171). Indeed, it became increasingly difficult for pro-
French citizens to affirm, as they had in the early 1790s, that the independence of the
United  States  required  close  ties  with  a  country  that  shared  the  same democratic,
fraternal,  and cosmopolitan values.  For the Federalists,  creating an enemy image of
France was also a way to promote a uniquely American form of patriotism and identity
that profoundly undermined the concept of French-American linkage. 
29 In  2003  also,  the  French  enemy  was  largely  the  invention  of  a  political  faction.
Francophobia was instrumentalized by neo-conservatives in the Bush administration
who  sought  to  advance  their  agenda  of  “regime  change”  in  the  Middle  East,  and
consequently led the United States to invade Iraq. However, their vision of the best
course to take was not shared by all Americans in the early stages of the crisis. A CBS
News/New York Times poll showed that 63% of Americans still favored a diplomatic
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solution over military intervention in late January 2003. Large popular demonstrations
against the war took place in New York and other American cities, and many influential
senators and congressional Representatives voted against the October 2002 motion to
authorize the use of United States armed forces against Iraq. Yet the most visible and
outspoken opposition to the war came from abroad, and especially from France. As
Hayes and Guardino point out:
Much of the discussion in the months leading up to the invasion focused on the
effectiveness of UN sanctions, whether Iraq had violated the sanctions, standards of
evidence for  the existence of  weapons of  mass  destruction,  and other technical
details involving international law and regulations. Thus, from the perspective of
dominant news norms, UN and other foreign officials were not merely components
of  an  amorphous  “other  side”  in  the  debate.  They  were  instead  central  to  the
development of the story […] (Hayes & Guardino 2010: 63-4)
30 As the “story” presented to the American public increasingly centered on opposition to
immediate military action in the United Nations council, “Oleaginous” foreign affairs
minister Dominique de Villepin became a favorite target of conservatives like George F.
Will, who accused him of leading his country into “an exercise for which France has
often  refined  its  savoir-faire  since  1870,  which  is  to  say  retreat  —  this  time  into
incoherence” (Will 2003). Donald Rumsfeld depicted France as the best representative
of  the  countries  of  “old  Europe”,  whose  outmoded  ways  and  culture  paled  in
comparison  with  the  energy  and  potential  of  the  post-communist  era  countries  of
eastern and central Europe that constituted a “new Europe” ready to align with the
United States. “The French remind me a little bit of an aging actress of the 1940s who is
still  trying to dine out on her looks but doesn’t have the face for it”,  Senator John
McCain stated in an interview (Montgomery 2003): if the comment was meant to be
humorous, it still added age-coded stereotypes to the “gender-coded stereotypes” that
have  historically  pegged  France  as  feminine  and  weak  in  the  American  psyche
(Rosenthal 1999). 
31 During the 2003 Iraq crisis, the words “French” and “France” became code words for
anti-American and unpatriotic: being “French” implicitly meant negating the values of
liberty,  democracy  and  courage  that  constituted  the  core  of  Americanness  as
understood by neo-conservatives. Significantly, France’s image fell much more sharply
among  Republicans  than  Democrats  at  the  start  of  the  Iraq  war  in  2003.  Between
February 2002 and March 2003, Republicans’ favorability toward France dropped more
than 60 points, from 81% to 20%, versus a 34-point decline among Democrats, from 79%
to  45% (The  Gallup  poll,  public  opinion  2016).  To  those  who  no  longer  considered
France  to  be  an  ally  of  the  United  States  and  believed  that  the  Gallic  nation  was
“stabbing the U.S.  in the back” (Moore 2003),  all  expressions of French culture and
nationality  became  suspicious.  The  lingering  effects  of  this  political
instrumentalization  of  the  anti-French  bias  were  clearly  seen  during  the  2004
presidential  election  campaign,  as  George  W.  Bush’s  camp  repeatedly  underscored
democratic  candidate  John  Kerry’s  ties  to  France.  Commerce  Secretary  Don  Evans
called  Kerry  a  “fellow  of  a  different  political  stripe  who  looks  French”,  and  the
Republican  National  Committee  issued  regular  news  releases  about  Kerry’s  French
relatives  and  his  alleged  popularity  in  France  (Milbank  2004).  The  democratic
candidate’s  consequent  refusal  to  speak  French  publicly  during  the  rest  of  the
campaign (Wilgoren 2007) attests to the political weight accusations of “Frenchness”
still carried in 2004.
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32 Condoleezza Rice’s intent to “punish France, ignore Germany, forgive Russia”, which
summed up the view of the hardliners in president George W. Bush’s administration at
the early stages of  the 2003 Iraq crisis,  begs the question:  why France? One simple
answer lies within the realm of International Relations:  France,  because of its  clear
refusal to act as a junior partner to the American superpower, was singled out as the
ring-leader  of  a  movement  that  sought  to  de-legitimize  the  position  of  the  United
States  in  the  United  Nations  Council.  As  Justin  Vaïsse  observes,  those  in  the  Bush
administration who favored military intervention “increasingly used France both as a
scapegoat for Washington’s own diplomatic failures (at the UN, but also in Turkey, as
Newt Gingrich suggested), and, more importantly, to discredit opposition to the war by
branding it ‘French,’ hence unpatriotic” (Vaïsse 2003b).
33 Another answer entails a complex system of representation of France as an enemy that
was born at the time of the Quasi-War of the late 1790s. It was then that the association
of France with terror and tyranny crystallized, an image that the Federalists turned
into a political weapon as they struggled to impose their vision of American identity
and  sought  to  affirm  U.S.  independence  on  the  geopolitical  chessboard.  This
representation of France was reactivated during the 2003 crisis,  as the French were
depicted as siding with despot Saddam Hussein, and implicitly with Islamist terrorists.
Hamilton’s  1798  association  between  a  threatening  “prophet  of  Mecca”  and  the
“tyrants of France” found a new incarnation in the rhetoric of those who accused the
French of cooperating with one of the leading members of the “axis of evil” in 2003.
Other  preexisting  stereotypes  of  the  French  as  unreliable,  cowardly,  difficult,
treacherous and effeminate came into play. These stereotypes can be traced as far back
as the Hundred Years War (1337–1453). As Rosenthal notes, British colonists in America
“absorbed, adapted, and perpetuated the jaundiced views of the mother country” on all
things French (Rosenthal 1999: 906). In the 1830s, when the United States attempted to
force France to honor spoliation claims for American shipping losses suffered during
the  Napoleonic  Wars,  Louis  Philippe  and  his  ministers  were  described  as  frivolous
“canting,  hypocritical,  smoothfaced”  villains  (New  Hampshire  Gazette,  September  22,
1835). In the early 1900s, American journalists, travelers and politicians often depicted
France as a decadent and effeminate nation (Verhoeven 2017). The same stereotypes
were reinvigorated during the two world wars,  when American soldiers complained
about French fickleness and unreliability.10 As Franck Costigliola has shown, American
officials in the Cold War era tended to view France “as a precariously perched domino,
its  people  peculiarly  susceptible  to  instability,  license,  and excess,  all  corollaries  of
what seemed a French perversion of the notion of liberty” (Costigliola 1992: 4-5). In
sum, a wide array of anti-French stereotypes were readily available to all those who
sought to attack France in 2003. 
34 Another explanation as to why France was singled out by diplomats and the American
media lies in the fact that, unlike the rest of Europe, the French lack a strong national
constituency in the United States. Consequently, as Irwin Wall notes, “What is clearly
politically incorrect and unacceptable when said of other national groups is permissible
with regard to the French” (Wall 2004: 128). Indeed, it would be unthinkable, in 21st-
century America, to publicly depict Germans, Russians or Italians as smelly, effeminate
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cowards  whose  faces  deserved  to  be  “rubbed  in  the  merde”  (Peters  2003).  Yet  the
absence of  a  visible “French-American” political  lobby in the United States allowed
American editorialists to forego political correctness when it came to the French.11 
35 After 2003, as after the Quasi-War, more cordial diplomatic relations resumed relatively
quickly between France and the United States. With the 1800 treaty of Mortefontaine,
the two nations annulled the treaty of  Amity of  1778 but  extended “most-favored”
trading status  to  each other.  In  1803,  Napoleon sold  the  Louisiana  territory  to  the
United  States  for  fifteen  million  dollars,  opening  a  vast  territory  to  American
expansion. The two nations enjoyed amicable relations between 1840 and 1917, a time
during which, as Jean-Baptiste Duroselle notes (1979:  485),  “there were no common
frontiers, no important political problems” between the two countries. 
36 After the 2003 Iraq crisis also, normal relations between the two nations resumed in
timely fashion. The process or rapprochement was gradual, as Frederic Bozo observes
(2016: 297-300). It entailed increased cooperation between U.S. and French intelligence
agencies in the fight against terrorism, France’s reaffirmed commitment to NATO in
Afghanistan, as well as renewed expressions of friendship during the celebration of the
60th anniversary  of  the  Normandy  invasion.  Both  sides  now  avoided  any  kind  of
aggressive  or  hurtful  rhetoric,  and  by  2005,  full  reconciliation  was  achieved.  In
February  2019,  81%  of  Americans  held  a  favorable  view  of  France  (Gallup  Country
ratings 2019), and talks of “Freedom fries” seemed like a distant memory. Yet the 2012
presidential campaign showed that anti-French rhetoric still could be used as a political
weapon when Republican party nomination candidate New Gingrich sponsored a video
clip titled “The French connection” against his opponent Mitt Romney. The short film,
accompanied  by  a  French  accordion  soundtrack,  depicted  Romney  as  a  French-
speaking, elitist liberal (Mardell 2012). More recently, articles and editorials in The New
York Times, The Washington Post,  and other American media have continued to depict
France and the French as resistant to progress, anti-Semitic, and contemptuous of their
immigrant populations,  often with few nuances.  The various forms of Francophobia
that have been described by Rosenthal (1999), Vaïsse (2003a), Mathy (2003) and others
sometimes underlie the opinions of those who write of France and the French for the
American  public.  As  Shoat  and  Stam  observe,  “U.S.  Francophobia,  in  sum,  is  the
specular  double of  Americanophobia  in  France  and  displays  the  same  earmarks  of
ethnoessentialist  thinking”  (Shohat  &  Stam  2007:  131).  Whether  future  diplomatic
crises revive these mutual tendencies to blame a stereotyped “other” from across the
Atlantic remains to be seen.
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NOTES
1. The list of reported losses is given in Williams 2009: 43-370.
2. As Frederic Bozo has shown, this rather large group included neo-conservative civilian officials
in the Pentagon and in Dick Cheney’s entourage, conservative Washington think tanks, as well as
more moderate administration officials (Bozo 2016: 275). For a detailed study of this complex
diplomatic crisis, see also Wall 2004.
3. On divisions among the American public concerning France, see the numbers given below in
part III.
4. The Washington Times, which is owned by Sun Myung Moon’s Unification Movement, is well-
known  for  its  conservative  outlook  and  fake  news.  The  New  York  Post is  owned  by  Rupert
Murdoch,  whose  media  empire  (which  includes  Fox)  often  resorts  to  anti-French  and  anti-
European rhetoric. 
5. As Rachel Hope Cleves has shown, British and American attacks on French militarism in the
late  1790s  frequently  contained  cannibalistic  imagery  that  signified  to  readers  the  anarchic
quality of Jacobin violence (Cleves 2010: 436).
6. Complaints  by  American  G.I.s  about  French hygiene,  morals  and general  unreliability  are
documented in the 1945 U.S. Military handbook 112 Gripes about the French,  a text designed to
defuse growing tensions between American soldiers and the French population. 
7. See the ratings of the show at http://graphics.wsj.com/late-night-tv-show-ratings-and-hosts/.
8. The list also includes Barry Rubin and Judith Colp Rubin’s Hating America: A History (2004), in
which the history of modern France in summarized thus: “France, a society priding itself on its
great history and even greater culture, trembled at any infusion of American culture because it
assumed that there was no possibility of competing fairly […] As a result, while France could
easily have won any sneering contest, it lost the battles that truly counted” (149).
9. The details of the media campaign against France are presented in Vaïsse 2003b.
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10. These complaints are documented in the 1945 U.S. Military handbook 112 Gripes about the
French.
11. On this idea see Vaïsse 2002. Jean-David Lévitte, the French Ambassador in Washington D.C.
during the Iraq crisis, offered a partial solution to the problem of lack of French representation
by reaching out to American Representatives and Senators. His efforts resulted in the creation of
the Congressional French Caucus in February 2004. 
ABSTRACTS
This article assesses the creation of an enemy image of France and the French in the United
States in two separate historical contexts. Although France and the United States have usually
enjoyed rather positive relations throughout history after the signing of the Treaty of Amity and
Commerce in 1778, the French were widely depicted as America’s enemy during the late 1790s
Quasi-War, and more recently after France refused to support U.S. military intervention in Iraq
in 2003-2004. In the first instance, an undeclared naval war opposed the two countries as the
French government allowed for seizure of American ships in the wake of the 1795 Jay Treaty the
US had signed with Great Britain, a conflict which escalated when U.S. navy later began to fight
the French in the Caribbean. In 2003-2004, an acute diplomatic crisis induced a confrontation
between the two nations when France suggested it would use its veto power to block passage of a
United Nations Security  Council  resolution authorizing a U.S.-  led military operation against
Iraq. The aim of this study is to provide an understanding of the process through which the
image of France was transformed, in both historical contexts, from that of ally and friend into
that  of  a  threatening  other.  Particular  attention  is  paid  to  the  creation  and  use  of  cultural
stereotypes  in  statements  by  American  officials,  as  well  as  in  the  media  campaigns  that
characterized both diplomatic crises. Although the enemy image of France underwent significant
changes between 1797 and 2003, our research shows that a number of cultural stereotypes that
were created during the Quasi-War were revived during the 2003 diplomatic crisis. Chief amongst
those is the association of France with terror and tyranny. This article also examines the deep
political divisions that pitted Federalists against Republicans in the 1790s, and Neo-Conservative
“hawks” against anti-war “doves” in 2003. These disputes shed light on the creation of enemy
images of France in the United States. In both cases, the French antagonist was as mirror and a
scapegoat that provides as much information on American identity and U.S. political debates as it
does about American views on France and the French.
Cet  article  a  pour  objet  d’apporter  un  éclairage  sur  la  création  de  l’image  d’un  « ennemi
français » dans deux contextes historiques distincts. Si les relations entre la France et les États-
Unis ont généralement été cordiales depuis la signature du Traité d’Amitié et de Commerce de
1778,  les Américains ont souvent décrit  les Français comme leurs ennemis pendant la Quasi-
Guerre des années 1790, et plus récemment, lors de la crise diplomatique déclenchée en 2003 par
l’intervention des États-Unis  en Irak.  Dans le  premier cas,  une guerre navale non déclarée a
opposé les deux nations après la signature du Traité de Londres entre Anglais et Américains en
1795:  suite  à  cet  accord,  le  Directorat  avait  autorisé  l’arraisonnement  de  navire  marchands
américains, provoquant un conflit qui s’étendit rapidement aux Antilles. En 2003-2004, une grave
crise diplomatique a provoqué une confrontation entre les deux nations au moment où la France
a menacé d’utiliser  son droit  de  véto  au Conseil  de  sécurité  de  l’ONU contre  une résolution
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américaine qui aurait autorisé une opération militaire en Irak. Nous avons voulu comprendre le
processus par lequel l’image de la France est passée de celle de pays allié des États-Unis à celle de
nation hostile et menaçante. Dans cette optique, nous analysons l’usage de stéréotypes culturels
dans les discours officiels de responsables américains, ainsi que dans les campagnes médiatiques
qui ont marqué les deux crises. Bien que l’image d’un « ennemi français » ait subi d’importantes
métamorphoses entre 1797 et 2003, nous constatons que plusieurs stéréotypes créés au moment
de la Quasi-Guerre ont été réactivés lors de la crise diplomatique de 2003. L’image d’une France
amie  de  la  terreur  et  de  la  tyrannie  ressort  tout  particulièrement  des  discours  et  des
représentations étudiées.  Les  profondes rivalités  politiques entre Fédéralistes  et  Républicains
pendant la Quasi-Guerre, puis entre « faucons » néo-conservateurs et « colombes » opposées à la
guerre  en  2003,  ont  également  retenu  notre  attention.  Ces  querelles  éclairent  la  création
d’images d’une « France ennemie » : dans les deux cas, l’antagoniste français a joué un double
rôle  de  miroir  et  de  victime  sacrificielle.  Ces  deux  fonctions  sont  tout  aussi  révélatrices  de
l’identité et  de la politique américaines que de la manière dont les Américains perçoivent la
France et les Français.
INDEX
Mots-clés: relations États-Unis-France, relations internationales, stéréotypes, Quasi-Guerre
(années 1790), guerre d’Irak (2003), France
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